Barr. Oludotun Sowemimo
The recent press release by the Rivers State National Assembly Caucus purporting to defend the declaration and implementation of emergency-style governance in Rivers State is not only constitutionally flawed but represents a dangerous retreat from democratic order. Upon close scrutiny under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, relevant Supreme Court precedents, the doctrine of separation of powers espoused by Montesquieu, and comparative jurisprudence from the United States, this so-called defense collapses under the weight of legal and institutional inconsistencies.
– 1. Misapplication of Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution and Misinterpretation of the February 28 Supreme Court Judgment
Section 305 of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. It provides that a State of Emergency can only be declared in response to war, insurrection, natural disaster, or situations that pose a clear and present threat to public safety and order. The Rivers situation is none of these. At most, it is a political crisis—one resolvable within constitutional institutions, not by executive fiat.
The February 28, 2025, Supreme Court ruling did not—and could not—vest the executive with powers to unilaterally collapse or restructure a duly elected state government. The Court’s remark that there was “no government” was a judicial censure of dysfunction, not a legal endorsement of absolute federal intervention.
Indeed, the decision reaffirms the sanctity of due process and intergovernmental checks. It does not license the substitution of elected structures with unelected agents. The caucus’s interpretation distorts the judgment to justify executive overreach.
2. Montesquieu’s Doctrine of Separation of Powers and U.S. Constitutional Comparisons
Montesquieu warned that liberty is imperilled when legislative and executive powers are concentrated in one arm. That is exactly the pathology we now witness: the National Assembly has ceded its oversight role, the judiciary is silent, and executive control is absolute.
The appointment of a retired naval officer as Sole Administrator in place of a sitting governor, without any impeachment, judicial removal, or electoral due process, is a blatant circumvention of democratic norms. That the individual is now “civilian” is constitutionally irrelevant. It is the fusion of legislative and executive power in one hand that marks the emergence of tyranny, not the uniform worn.
In the United States, even at the height of emergencies—e.g., the aftermath of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, or COVID-19—executive power was rigorously constrained. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that even wartime necessity could not justify President Truman’s unilateral seizure of steel mills. Emergency power, the Court held, must be rooted in congressional authorisation.
Nigeria’s current approach violates that exact principle. Power has been in the hands of the usurper, not checked.
3. Institutional Dereliction: INEC, Judiciary, National Assembly
INEC, constitutionally charged with conducting credible elections and resolving electoral disputes, has been mute. Despite the political instability cited as justification for federal intervention, there is no public evidence that INEC investigated allegations of rigging or malpractices. The removal of elected officials without a rerun or proper adjudication is unconstitutional.
The Judiciary, meant to be the bulwark of rights and limits on power, has largely abdicated its role. No orders of injunction. No expedited hearings. No pronouncements on the legality or duration of the so-called emergency. This passivity fosters executive impunity.
The National Assembly, which ought to act as a check on executive encroachment, has instead functioned as an enabler. The press release reveals a rubber-stamp legislature more concerned with silencing dissent, evidenced by veiled threats against Senator Henry Dickson, than protecting the constitutional order.
This is institutional erosion masquerading as governance.
4. Distortion of the Concept of “Military Rule”
The caucus argues that because the Sole Administrator is now a civilian, Senator Dickson’s invocation of “military rule” is inappropriate. This is a red herring.
“Military rule” is not about uniformity; it is about governance without constitutional accountability. By vesting both executive and legislative authority in a federally appointed administrator, with no electoral legitimacy, and with the complicity of the federal legislature, the situation in Rivers mimics authoritarian governance. That’s the essence of military rule in civilian clothing.
This is the exact fusion of powers Montesquieu warned against—where the same hand makes the law, executes it, and judges infractions.
5. Lessons from U.S. Emergency Jurisprudence
In the U.S., the Youngstown doctrine remains the leading guide on emergency powers: the President cannot act without explicit congressional approval, and certainly cannot override state-level democratic processes.
Nowhere in American federal practice is a governor suspended or replaced without due process. The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. § 1621–1646) requires presidential declarations to be time-bound, specific, and reviewed by Congress. Even during wars or pandemics, elected officials retain their mandate unless removed through constitutional means.
Nigeria’s model, in contrast, allows executive encroachment under a thin constitutional veneer—a gross distortion of federalism and democratic responsibility.
6. Conclusion: An Assault on Democracy
This press release is not a defense of constitutionalism—it is a justification of authoritarianism cloaked in legality. We must call it what it is:
1. A misuse of emergency powers for political ends.
2. A failure of INEC and the judiciary to exercise their roles as institutional gatekeepers.
3. A National Assembly that has surrendered its deliberative function to become a megaphone for the executive.
4. A subversion of electoral mandates, with long-term implications for Nigeria’s fragile democracy.
Unless reversed, this sets a dangerous precedent where political disagreements can be reclassified as “emergencies” to justify federal takeovers.
RECOMMENDATIONS
INEC must immediately initiate a public inquiry into the electoral situation in Rivers.
The Judiciary must entertain suits challenging the emergency’s constitutionality and duration.
The National Assembly must publish its voting records, hold public hearings, and restore oversight.
Civil Society & Media must demand accountability and preserve constitutional values by spotlighting institutional overreach.
Final Word:
The Rivers emergency is not just a local political issue—it is a constitutional litmus test. Will Nigeria uphold the doctrine of separation of powers and federalism, or slide into executive absolutism under the guise of governance?
For the sake of our democracy, the answer must be clear and firm.
— Barr. Oludotun Sowemimo, Constitutional Lawyer & Public Affairs Analyst
